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Improper Argument
to Juries in Civil Cases
The author of this Note sets forth the rules used by
appellate courts in deciding appeals based on im-
proper argument to juries in civil cases, and then ana-
lyzes those rules to determine whether or not they
fulfill their function- assuring the litigants a fair trial.
The author concludes that probably the rules are not
very effective in assuring fair trials, and he suggests
possible ways of improving the law dealing with
improper arguments.
"Next to perjury, prejudice, as taken advantage of by
the unworthy and as fostered and utilized where bad
legal methods prevail, is the main cause of miscar-
riages of justice." Osborn, The Mind of the Juror
87 (1937).
A COMMON way, used by some attorneys, to take advan-
tage of and foster prejudice in a trial is by improper argument to
the jury. Whether or not Osborn's comment about "miscarriages of
justice" is true, there are a substantial number of cases arising each
year which end in appeals based on improper argument' An im-
proper argument exposes to the jury's consideration material which
either could not or has not been admitted into evidence,2 and in-
creases the possibility that the jury will be prejudicially influenced in
reaching their decision. 3 If the jury is so influenced, the losing party
1. See the hundreds of cases cited in 88 CJ.S. Trial § 200 (1951); 64 C.J. Trial
§ 310 (1929).
2. One of the few attempts to generally define "improper argument" is found in
Jones, Reversible Error in Argument to the Jury, 2 ALA. Lmw. 152, 153 (1941):
[Alny argument of counsel to the jury stating a fact pertinent to the issue
unsupported by the evidence, and having a tendency to influence the finding
of the jury, and which is not in keeping with the law, is improper. Arguments
should be confined to facts shown by the testimony and to fair and reasonable
deductions therefrom.
However, this definition does not make any apparent attempt at being all inclusive.
3. Many factors other than the argument of counsel may prejudice the jury. The
parties or their witnesses may volunteer inadmissible material. Even the appearance
of the parties may create prejudice, where, for example, one of the parties is a
foreigner or a Negro. But as the court said in Hesse v. The St. John Ry., 30 S.C.IL
218, 239 (1899), as cited in Owaa, LGArL ETmIcs 47 (1957):
It is perhaps impossible to prevent jurors looking at a case in this way ["If I
were the plaintiff, under the evidence, how much ought I to be pai if the
Company did me an injury?"], but at least they ought not to be invited to do
so, and such direct resorts or appeals to the feelings and interests of the individ-
ual jurymen can only exercise a disturbing or misleading influence.
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has been deprived of the fair trial to which he is entitled.4 Courts
have formulated certain rules intended to maintain the fair trial
standard in cases where improper argument occurs. The purpose
of this Note is to set forth the rules used by appellate courts in
deciding appeals based on improper argument to juries in civil
cases,5 and to analyze whether or not those rules fulfill their func-
tion-assuring the litigants a fair trial.
I. TYPES OF IMPROPER ARGUMENT
The most common types of improper argument are: An appeal
to the jury to consider the opposing party s race, religion, nation-
ality 6 or social or political preferences;" an argument framed on
the "deeper pocket doctrine," contrasting the financial status of the
parties 8 or informing the jury that the defendant is or is not covered
A somewhat contrary view is represented by the following excerpt from Fields v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 S.W.2d 463, 467-68 (Mo. App. 1938):
It may be taken for granted that the statement in question was designed by
counsel to be an appeal to what be deemed or hoped to be the sympathies or
economic prejudices of the jurors. It is conceivable that in the case of a weak
or ignorant juror the statement might have had the effect which plaintiff's
counsel desired for it, but in the case of an average juror of the ordinary intelli-
gence we would think that the effect would more likely have been just the
opposite. Jurors who value the responsibilities of their office are wont to resent
any argument directed to them which implies that the attorney making the
argument holds but little regard for either their intelligence or integrity, and if
the truth were known we have no doubt that appeals to sentimental emotions
harm quite as often as they help.
4. See, e.g., Loftin v. City of Kansas City, 164 Kan. 412, 190 P.2d 378 (1948);
Strother v. McClave, 264 Ky. 121, 94 S.W.2d 310 (1936); Maher v. Roisner, 239
Minn. 115, 57 N.W.2d 810 (1953). See also McWilliams v. The Sentinel Pub. Co,,
339 Ill. App. 83, 89 N.E.2d 266 (1949) ("grave miscarriage of justice").
5. The principles governing improper argument in criminal cases are not identical
to those in civil cases. Since the prosecutor s argument may be given more credence
by the jury, because of his seemingly impartial status as an official of the state,
the trial judge must more readily interfere to protect the rights of the criminal
defendant than to protect those of the parties in a civil case. See generally Note,
54 COLuM. L. REv. 946 (1954); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 303 (1956).
6. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1438 (1932). Race: Interstate Life & Accident
Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 611, 193 S.E. 458, 465 (1937) ("negro-stealing
society"); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex.
1954) ("why then didn't they bring ...some white fellow that you could see and
know was telling the truth"); Religion: Nemet v. Friedland, 273 Mich. 692, 696,
263 N.W. 889, 890 (1935) ("Jew Shylock"); Peck v. Bez, 129 W. Va. 247, 261, 40
S.E.2d 1, 9 (1946) ("Mohammedan"); Morgan v. Maunders, 34 S.W.2d 791, 794
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ("Plaintiff would not be able to attend her Methodist
Church"); Nationality:Panteles v. Arsht, 227 Ill. App. 488, 492 (1923) ("this poor,
ignorant Greek has rights just as sacred as this Jew"); Fathman v. Tumilty, 34 Mo.
App. 236 (1889) ("it [the case] is nothing but an attempt on the part of an 'Irish-
man' to beat a 'Dutchman' out of an honest debt").
7. See, e.g., Louisville Ry. v. Mitchell, 138 Ky. 190, 200, 127 S.W. 770, 773
(1910) ("strike breaker"); Robinson v. Casey, 272 S.W. 586, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) ("free love").
8. See, e.g., Criego v. Conwell, 54 N.M. 287, 291, 222 P.2d 606, 608 (1950)
("whether the loss suffered by ... [deceased's] widow and her six children should
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by liability insurance;I an argument directed against a party be-
cause of its status as a corporation; 10 or an argument couched in
unfounded, derogatory statements against the opposing party, his
counsel or witnesses." Courts regard some types of improper argu-
ment as more likely than other types to have a prejudicial effect
upon the jury; for example, courts generally agree that prejudice
is apt to result from a reference to the fact that the defendant is or
is not protected by liability insurance, or an argument directed at
the opposing party's race, religion or nationality.12 Courts generally
do not think that prejudice is very likely to result from an argument
directed at a party because of his nonlocal residence or from an
argument contrasting the financial status of the parties. 3 But since
a highly inflammatory argument contrasting the financial status of
the parties may be as prejudicial, if not more so, than a mild refer-
ence to a defendant's race, courts generally apply the same rules to
be borne by the public relief agencies or by ... [defendants] who caused and
were responsible for [it]"); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Lide, 117 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) ("All of the railroads in the country are 'owned by New York
millionaires ").
9. See, e.g., Fleet Carrier Corp. v. Lahere, 184 Pa. Super. 201, 132 A.2d 723
(1957); King v. Starr, 43 Wash. 2d 115, 260 P.2d 351 (1953).
10. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Rennard, 128 Ill App. 181, 186 (1906), ("the
defendant was a corporation without a soul to answer hereafter"); Montgomery-
Ward & Co. v. Wooley, 94 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950); Hoffnan v. Berwind-
White Coal Min. Co., 265 Pa. 476, 485, 109 Atl. 234, 238 (1920) (defendant
called "octopus" and "sneaking, hiding, sulking ...company").
11. See, e.g., Belfield v. Coop, 8 III. 2d 293, 312, 134 N.E.2d 249, 259 (1956)
(defendants called "thieves," "usurpers," and "defrauders"); Dannals v. Sylvania
Twp., 255 Pa. 156, 162, 99 At. 475, 476 (1916) ("The slums of the community
were dug over to dig out that drunkard [defendants witness] that has slept in the
jails more nights than you or I can tell it. Don't you think I don't know that
drunkard and gutter-snipe that has been a disgrace to our community since he
come there"); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Wilkerson, 260 S.W.2d 912, 923 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953) (referred to defendant's attorney as "Baby Bill").
12. See, e.g., Jonte v. Key System, 89 Cal. App. 2d 654, 659-60, 201 P.2d 562,
566 (1949) ("The censured expressions in this case did not contain an appeal to
dangerous prejudices, racial or otherwise, as in some cases in which reversal was
held necessary, and it seems probable that the jury saw through the unsupported
rhetorical attacks of plaintiff's counsel and did not permit them to influence their
verdict"); Angelina Casualty Co. v. Ryan, 282 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Teax. Civ. App.
1955) ("Where the argument is improper only because its nature is calculated to
inflame the minds and arouse the passion of prejudice such argument is usually
regarded as being of the 'curable' type. However, this is not an invariable rule.
Appeals to National, racial or religious prejudice are apt to be held not curable by
instruction to disregard the same."). See also Cox, Errors in Jury Argument, 6 T.
BAn. J. 536, 552 (194), for individual argument classification; Comment, 10 O=.A.
L. REv. 359, 362 (1957) (insurance).
13. Attempts at a hard and fast classification based on the subject matter of
improper arguments have not been successful, because of the many variables of each
particular case. But a jury's prejudice against a certain race or religion is apt to be
far stronger than a prejudice against wealthy people or people from a different
state. This is well illustrated by recent Southern Negro maltreatment; while no one
would expect to see a Californian mistreated for being a Californian, or a wealthy
person s house being bombed for being a wealthy person.
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all forms of improper argument irrespective of the subject matter
of that argument. 14
II. THE RULES REGARDING IMPROPER ARGUMENT: SUMMARIZED
If the jury has not been prejudicially influenced by the improper
argument, neither party has been denied a fair trial." Thus the
courts have developed rules based principally on that factor - jury
reaction- although it is questionable how accurately, if at all,
courts can measure a jury's reaction to improper argument. " To
some extent, however, these rules are probably based on a desire
to directly curb counsel's misconduct by punishing him for inten-
tional improper argument. 17
The rules used to guide appellate courts in improper argument
cases can be summarized as follows:
A. Trial judges' discretion
A trial judge has broad discretion in determining the effect of
an improper argument upon the jury, and his ruling on the
matter will withstand all but an abuse of such discretion.' 8
14. See generally Annots., 32 A.L.R.2d 9 (1953); 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949); 78
A.L.R. 1438 (1932): See, e.g., Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana Inc. v. Westbrook,
207 Ark. 270, 180 S.W.2d 121 (1944); Wade v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150
Tex. 557, 565, 244 S.W.2d 197, 201 (1951) ("We judge by the degree of vice, not
merely the subject matter of the argument").
15. In other words there has been at most harmless error. E.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 61
provides:
No error . . . or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for
setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.
16. There are several ways to attempt to find whether the jury was influenced.
They might be required to defend their verdict, but:
The court protects the jury from all investigation and inquiry as fully as the
temple authorities protected the priestess who spoke to the supplient votary at
the shrine.
Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (1948) (Judge Frank). It
would seem possible, though impractical, to ascertain the prejudices of the jury by
using psychological tests. See generally, Redmount, Psychological Tests for Selecting
Jurors, 5 KAN. L. REv. 391 (1957).
17. If trial courts, upon the happening of such a circumstance [a prejudicial
remark], would declare a mistrial and assess the costs to the transgressor, It
would have a salutory effect upon lawyers who know better, or if they did not
know better, would pay for the lesson then learned.
Lewis v. Oliver, 129 Colo. 479, 482-83, 271 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1954).
18. This is so when he refuses to grant a new trial, e.g., Falzone v. Cruner, 132
Conn. 415, 45 A.2d 153 (1945); Patton v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 247 Minn. 368,
77 N.W.2d 433 (1956). And also when he grants a new trial, e.g., Frohlich v. City
of New Haven, 163 Atl. 463 (Conn. 1932).
Arguments to the jury become along with many other things a part of the
atmosphere of the case. The atmosphere of a case is difficult to ascertain from
the record. It is composed not only of the words which are used, but also of the
inflections of the voice and the conduct of the participants, even at times the
NOTES
B. Weight of the evidence
An appellate court will review the evidence presented at the
trial to determine whether or not it is sufficient to sustain the
jury's verdict, irrespective of the improper argument.'0
C. De minimis and per se
An improper argument will be deemed harmless, and will
afford no grounds for reversal, if the argument was extremely
unlikely to have influenced the jury in the particular case.:0 On
the other hand, a flagrantly improper argument which is clearly
prejudicial against the opposing party will necessitate a new
tria and the trial judge's failure to declare a mistrial on his own
initiative is reversible error.2'
D. Curative action
If action is taken at the trial level that is intended to neutralize
any prejudicial effect of an improper argument, it is presumed
to have been successful and that consequently the jury did not
consider the argument.2 The "curative action" may be any one
or more of the following, depending upon the nature and
degree of the argument and other circumstances of the case:
(1) The court may sustain an objection.2
(2) The court may instruct the jury to disregard the argument 2 '
(3) The court may reprimand the offending counsel for his
conduct.
2 5
(4) The offending counsel may withdraw the improper argu-
ment.
26
E. Waiver
If the offended party's counsel fails to object to the improper
audience reaction.... The trial judge, who breathed the atmosphere of the
case, is far more able to determine whether the parties received a fair trial than
we are.
Dura Seal Prod. Co. v. Carver, 181 Pa. Super. 377, 381-82, 124 A.2d 438, 440
(1956). See generally Kunin, The Duty or Discretion of the Trial Judge to Declare
a Mistrial, 10 N.Y.U. INA. L. REv. 285 (1955).
19. See, e.g., cases cited notes 3-86 infra.
20. See, e.g., Stanley v. Kawakami, 127 Cal. App. 2d. 277, 273 P.2d 709 (1954);
Angle v. Bilby, 25 Neb. 595, 41 N.W. 397 (1889).
21. See, e.g., MeWilliams v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 Ill. App. 83, 89 N.E.2d. 266
(1949); In re Widening of Woodward Ave., 297 Mich. 235, 297 N.W. 468 (1941);
Maher v. Roisner, 239 Minn. 115, 57 N.W.2d 810 (1953).
22. See, e.g., Devine v. Chicago City Ry., 167 IlL App. 361 (1912).
23. See Brush v. Laurendine, 168 Miss. 7, 150 So. 818 (1933).
24. See, e.g., Day v. Ferguson, 74 Ark. 298, 85 S.W. 771 (1905); Anderson
v. Enfield, 244 Mim. 474, 70 N.W.2d 409 (1955).
25. See, e.g., Dabbs v. Richardson, 137 Miss. 789, 102 So. 769 (1925); Dixon v.
Business Mens' Assur. Co., 285 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955).
26. See, e.g., Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 203 Pae. 289 (1921); James
Smith Woolen Machinery Co. v. Holden, 73 Vt. 396, 51 Atl. 2 (1901).
1959]
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argument or retaliates with an improper argument of his own,
the alleged error will generally be deemed to have been
waived. 7
III. THE RuLEs REGARDING IMPROPER ARGUMENT: ANALYZED
A. TRIAL JUDGE'S DIsCRETION
The broad scope of the trial judge's discretion underlies all other
rules applied in improper argument cases. Since the judge is present
when the argument is made, the appellate courts generally abide
by his determination as to the impact the argument had on the
jury.25 And in most cases reaching appellate courts the trial judge
has had an opportunity to rule on the argument upon objection by
the opposing counsel. If the trial judge overruled the objection and
also denied other relief requested, and the appellate court deter-
mines that there was improper argument, the case will probably be
reversed on the ground that the trial judge abused his discretion.
His implied approval of counsel's argument may have unduly influ-
enced the jury.29 But if the trial judge adopted the other extreme
and declared a mistrial or a new trial, the appellate court will seldom
reverse the lower court's ruling.3 ° More frequently than not, how-
ever, the trial judge adopts a middle position and takes "curative"
action intended to remove the prejudicial effect of an improper
argument from the minds of the jury. Some appellate courts have
noted that the reluctance of trial courts to grant mistrials may be a
factor in the increasingly large number of cases in which improper
arguments are made.31
B. WEIGHT OF THE EviDENCE
The most important question in any improper argument case is
whether or not the improper argument prejudicially influenced the
jury so that the losing party was deprived of a fair trial. If the
27. See, e.g.: Objection: White v. Gregory, 126 Ind. 95, 25 N.E. 806 (1890);
Hilton v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950); Retaliation: Donovan
v. Richmond, 61 Mich. 467, 28 N.W. 516 (1886); Invitation: Brann v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424 (1943).
28. See, e.g., Hulburd v. Worthington, 57 Cal. App. 2d 477, 134 P.2d 832 (1943);
Lee v. Lee, 248 Minn. 496, 80 N.W.2d 529 (1957); Douglas v. Lang, 124 S.W.2d
642 (Mo. 1939).
29. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Painters v. Trimm, 207 Ala. 587, 93 So. 533 (1922).
30. See, e.g., Dura Seal Prod. Co. v. Carver, 181 Pa. Super. 377, 124 A.2d 438
(1956). Such an order may not be appealable, however, as in Minnesota. Cunning-
ham, Appealable Orders in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REV. 309, 331 (1953).
31. See, e.g., Lewis v. Oliver, 129 Colo. 479, 271 P.2d 1055 (1954); Owensboro
Shovel & Tool Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 431, 157 S.W. 1121 (1913); Coucher v.
Woodmen Acc. Co. of Lincoln, Neb., 231 Mo. App. 573, 104 S.W.2d 289 (1937);
Davis v. Stowe Twp., 256 Pa. 86, 100 At. 529 (1917). But see Eizerman v. Bohn,
9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956); Barrell v. Dickinson, 82 Vt. 551, 74 AtI.
234 (1909).
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weight of the evidence is such that the winning party would have
won even had there been no improper argument, the losing party
has not been harmed.32 Similarly, if the weight of the evidence is
clearly against the winning party, the judgment should be reversed
without even considering the improper argument.3 Some appellate
courts, reviewing the weight of evidence presented at a trial have
arrived at doubtful conclusions. For example, in a recent Texas case,
in which the defendant's attorney accused the plaintiffs attorney
of bribing his medical witness, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed
a verdict for the defendant on the ground that "the argument ...
'probably influenced the verdict unfavorably to petitioner.' The
issue between the parties . . .was very closely drawn."34 The
Texas Supreme Court in turn reversed the civil appeals court deci-
sion, saying "We believe that any fair jury would have reached the
same verdict regardless of the argument of counsel for the peti-
tioners." 3 5
Where the evidence is close, as it apparently was in the Texas
case, and more than a de minimis improper argument is made, it is
difficult to see why the probability is not just as great that the jury
were prejudiced as that they were not, unless, of course, effective
"curative" action is taken at the trial level. Thus it is doubtful that
the fair trial standard is met in such cases without reversing and
remanding for a new trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
reasoned:
Plaintiffs evidence to sustain recovery is not strong. There was so much
evidence to contradict his claim, given by so many apparently credible
witnesses, that his right to recover is a close and doultful question. In
32. See, e.g., Hulburd v. Worthington, 57 Cal. App. 2d 477, 134 P.2d 832 (1943);
Lumbermens Lloyds v. Loper, 153 Tex. 404, 269 S.W.2d 367 (1954).
33. See, e.g., Ball v. Murray, 93 Ga. App. 682, 92 S.E.2d 562 (1956); Shurdut
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 820 Mass. 728, 71 N.E.2d 391 (1947). Of
course, the evidence must be greater to sustain an order for judgment n.o.v. than
is necessary for the granting of a new til for insufficiency of evidence.
34. Loper v. Lumbermen's Lloyds, 269 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
35. Lumbermen's Lloyds v. Loper, 153 Tex. 404, 411, 269 S.W.2d 867, 371
(1954). But this did not end the troubles of the court of appeals, for in Southern
Pac. Co. v. Hubbard, 290 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) that court
affrmed a judgment for the plaintiff where plaintiff's counsel made improper argu-
ment against railroads, and said: "The facts of the accident are uncontradicted ...
the verdict is by no means excessive. The verdict is amply supported by the evi-
dence." The Texas Supreme Court held on appeal that the evidence did not support
the plaintiffs verdict and remanded the case. Southern Pac. Co. v. Hubbard, 156
Tex. 525, 297 S.W.2d 120 (1956). See also Romann v. Bender, 184 Minn. 586, 239
N.W.596 (1931), where the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a judgment for
plaintiff because improper argument had been made and the evidence was close; at
the second trial improper argument was again made by the plaintiffs counsel, but
the supreme court alffrmed holding that no prejudice resulted. The dissenting justice
recommended reversal for misconduct because the evidence for plaintiff was "very
unsatisfactory." Romann v. Bender, 190 Minn. 419, 426, 252 N.W. 80, 83 (1934).
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that situation, the recovery of a verdict, after serious misconduct of his
counsel, is a sufficient showing of prejudice. 36
Instead of weighing the evidence supporting the finding of lia-
bility some courts may look only to the amount of the plaintiff's
verdict to determine whether or not the jury was adversely preju-
diced. A finding that the verdict is not excessive raises an inference
that the improper argument was harmless. 7 But some courts have
criticized this test:
It is suggested that as no claim is made that the damages are excessive
there was no prejudice to the defendant. If the argument prejudiced the
jury against the defendant, that prejudice was as likely to affect their
judgment in regard to the defendant's liability as in regard to the amount
of the liability.38
The jury may award the plaintiff a verdict limited to reasonable
compensation for the injury he suffered, even though he is not
entitled to a verdict at all. A similar argument is also persuasive
where the court finds the verdict to be excessive due to prejudice
and reduces the amount of the judgment or remands the case for
retrial of the damages issue; "obviously such means [improper argu-
ment] may be quite as effective to beget a wholly wrong verdict as
to produce an excessive one.""
The same criticism cannot be made of the many cases in which
courts have found improper argument and an excessive verdict, but
have held that the excessive verdict was not due to prejudice stem-
ming from the improper argument.40 In some of these cases, how-
36. Romann v. Bender, 184 Minn. 586, 589, 239 N.W. 596, 597 (1931).
37. See, e.g., Finn v. City of Adrian, 93 Mich. 463, 53 N.W. 614 (1892); Harris
v. Breezy Point Lodge, 238 Minn. 322, 56 N.W.2d 655 (1953).
38. Appel v. Chicago City Ry., 259 Ill. 561, 102 N.E. 1021, 1024 (1913).
See also Loftin v. City of Kansas City, 164 Kan, 412, 190 P.2d 378 (1948); Jeddelob
v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 18 N.W.2d 582, 588 (1945); Hanley v. Milwaukee
Electric Ry. & Light Co., 220 Wis. 281, 263 N.W. 638 (1935); Smith v. Boston &
M.R.R., 88 N.H. 430, 191 At. 833 (1937); Comment, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 359 (1957).
39. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521 (1931). Tho
Minnesota Supreme Court had found the verdict excessive due to prejudice caused by
an improper argument on defendant's insurance, but refused to remand for a new
trial. The court did require the plaintiff to agree to a remittitur. The United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
40. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. Gee, 197 Ark. 925, 125 S.W.2d 802
(1939); LaCombe v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 236 Minn. 86, 51 N.W.2d 839 (1952);
Gunter v. Whitener, 75 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1934). See also Cosar v. Bemo, 282 P.2d
222 (Okla. 1955) (dissenting opinion). In LaCombe the court stated:
In the exercise of a sound discretion, the trial court may, by reason of passion
and prejudice exhibited in the award of excessive (or inadequate) damages,
grant a new trial upon the sole issue of damages when it appears upon the
evidence that the other issues, wholly unaffected by passion and prejudice,
have been thoroughly litigated and justly determined, so that a right of recovery
has been clearly established.
236 Minn. at 93, 51 N.W.2d at 844.
For a general discussion of excessive verdicts see Note, 16 MINN. L. Rtv. 185
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ever, it may be arguable that there was no other possible cause for
the excessive verdict 4' Perhaps an excessive verdict should raise an
inference that the improper argument prejudicially influenced the
jury.
C. DE M.nvmm AND PER SE
The de minimis and per se rules define the extremes of improper
argument. Where it is apparent to the court that the improper
argument is so slight it is extremely unlikely to unfairly influence the
jury, the argument will be deemed to be harmless; 4 2 the improper
argument has been de minnnis.
Courts are not justified in assuming that the mind of the jury is of such
plastic and unreliable material as to at any unjustified word of debate
neglect the instructions, abandon the evidence and disregard their oaths.43
Of course, if the trial judge has erroneously overruled an objection
by the opposing counsel, he may have created prejudice by under-
scoring the argument and giving the jury the impression that they
can properly consider it in reaching a verdict. And a reversal may
be necessary to afford the opposing party a fair trial.
(1932), and for a criticism of appellate court review over size of verdicts, see
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minw. L. REv. 751
(1957).
41. The following excerpt is taken from Cleveland Ry. v. Crooks, 130 Ohio
St. 255, 256-58, 198 N.E. 867, 868--69 (1935):
Although the Common Pleas Court found the verdict excessive to the extent of
practically one-third, and the Court of Appeals found the same to be excessive
to the extent of practically two-thirds, it was found by each court that such
excessive damages were not the result of passion or prejudice. [T]he record
clearly discloses such improper statements of counsel ... as were well cal-
culated to mislead the jury and induce it to return [an excessive verdict]....
The record in this case not only warranted but required the conclusion that
the verdict of the jury found to be so grossly excessive was the result of
passion or prejudice.
42. Obviously, classifying the argument de minimis must in part be dependent
upon the context in which it was made. The classification of harmless error is more
apt to be found where the evidence preponderates in the wrongdoer's favor or
where the argument is not directed against the parties involved in the suit. A bare
reference to the fact that defendant is a "corporation," an "exservicenan," or a
"Democrat," while improper, probably will be disregarded by the jury as fast as
the reference is made. But if this factor is stressed and allowed to linger in the
jurors minds it may influence them.
48. Devine v. Chicago City By., 167 IlM App. 861, 864 (1912).
44. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Painters v. Trimm, 207 Ala. 587, 588, 93 So. 533
(1922), a contract action for death benefits in which the plaintiff's attorney argued
that the local union "would gladly pay ... if they had charge of the disbursement
of the money. Gentlemen, you are not rendering a verdict against the local union
here, but these people up in Indiana." Upon objection the court ruled that this was
a "matter of argument" and denied a requested instruction to disregard. In Anderson
v. Hawthorne Fuel Co., 201 Minn. 580, 581-82, 277 N.W. 259, 260 (1938), plain-
tiff's attorney argued that he was no match for the defendant's attorney, an "out-
standing trial lawyer" of a 24 man firm who appears in court in cases where "there
is no defense," and that "it is only large corporations like ... [defendant] that can
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The other extreme is improper argument so flagrant that the court
must conclude that it very probably prejudicially influenced the
jury, and that no action at the trial could have avoided its harmful
effect to the opposing party.40 These arguments are considered
prejudicial per se,46 and such conduct is grounds for the immediate
declaration of a mistrial. Failure of the trial judge to so declare on
his own motion will be reversible error.47 The determination whether
or not an argument is prejudicial per se must be made by examining
the facts of the particular case and the context in which the argu-
ment was made.48 Only an extremely flagrant argument-for ex-
ample, a vehement attack against a party because of its status as a
"soulless, heartless corporation, 4 because the party "is a Jew,"5 0
or because the parties are "sweet scented apple blossoms from
Russia,""5 -is in this classification.
Courts often say that an attorney's good faith or inadvertence
is no excuse for making improper argument, and that reversals are
obtain the services of men like Mr. - ." Counsel continued, "Poor men, like ...
[plaintiff]," but at this point opposing counsel objected and requested that the jury
be instructed to disregard the argument; the judge said to plaintiff's attorney, "I
think that is probably true."
45. See, e.g., Watts v. Espy, 211 Ala. 502, 101 So. 106 (1924); King v. Starr,
43 Wash. 2d 115, 260 P.2d 351 (1953).
46. The courts often used the term "incurable" to indicate that the argument had
prejudicial affect upon the jury, which could not be removed by any action at the
trial level short of declaring a mistrial.
47. See, e.g., Watts v. Espy, 211 Ala. 502, 101 So. 106 (1924); Sleeper v. World
of Mirth Show, Inc., 100 N.H. 158, 121 A.2d 799 (1956).
48. See, e.g., Tri-State Transit Co. v. Westbrook, 207 Ark. 270, 180 S.W.2d 121
(1944) (intent of counsel and combined effect of argument requires reversal); Loftin
v. City of Kansas City, 164 Kan. 412, 190 P.2d 378 (1948) (repeated violation and
intent); Ellwein v. Holmes, 243 Minn. 397, 68 N.W.2d 220 (1955) (typo of case
makes argument incurable); Halton v. Fellows, 157 Ore. 514, 73 P.2d 080
(1937) (repetition).
We think the argument complained of can be properly evaluated only when it
is borne in mind that a verdict for a large amount was returned after only a
short deliberation by the jury in favor of a woman in dire physical and financial
circumstances, a resident of the community where the case was tried and where
the jurors lived, on evidence which we believe was insufficient to support the
finding that the appellant railroad company caused the injuries to this unfortu-
nate woman.
Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Wilkerson, 260 S.W.2d 912, 922-23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
49. See Western & A.R.R. v. Cox, 115 Ga. 715, 717, 42 S.E. 74, 75 (1902): "The
only way to reach a railroad is to make it pay money. A railroad has no soul, no
conscience, no sympathy, and no God." The court said it was reversible error for the
trial judge to refuse to declare a mistrial. But compare Calvenston, H. & S.A.R.R. v.
Smith, 93 S.W. 184, 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906). The court here held no reversible
error as there was nothing in the language to inflame the jury where plaintiff's attorney
argued "This is a suit by a person against a corporation,-a suit by one of God s
creatures against one of law's creatures . . . [a corporation] is without conscience,
without feeling, without heart, and without soul."
50. McWilliams v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 171. App. 83, 89 N.E.2d 266 (1949).
51. Trachenberg v. Castillo, 257 S.W. 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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not granted for the purpose of punishing counsel.- But this does
not mean they will not consider the intent with which the argument
was made, and improper arguments made with a purpose to instill
prejudice have proved more susceptible to being classified as per se
prejudicial than those made through inadvertence. 3 Perhaps the
reason courts consider the attorneys intent relevant is discernible
from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Hubbard.54 The plaintiff's attorney, who was accused of
improper argument in the trial court, had argued on an appeal by
the opposing counsel that anyone present at the trial would realize
that the jury would have reached the same verdict no matter what
arguments had been made. The Texas court held that improper
argument to be per se prejudicial, saying:
[The argument by plaintiff's counsel] seems less convincing when we
remember that he himself was present at the trial and presumably
observed and evaluated all the circumstances and conditions existing just
before he made his arguments. At that time with all the conditions fresh
before him, their evaluation present in his mind, and the possibilities of
an adverse verdict looming before him, he decided to make the improper
arguments. So he made them, and won. What he now argues with his
victory secure and the memory of the fear of defeat grown dim, is not any
more convincing than his res gestae action at the time of the trial.5
Cases in which the appellate court has learned that the offending
counsel has used improper argument in prior trials generally have
been reversed and remanded for a new trial," although it is not at
all clear that this factor was decisive.
D. CuxRATiV ACTION
Courts presume that the prejudicial effect of an improper arg-
ment that is not per se prejudicial can be removed by action at the
trial level 57 The type of action deemed capable of rendering the
52. See, e.g., Maher v. Roisner, 239 Minn. 115, 57 N.W.2d 810 (1953); Paska v.
Saunders, 103 Vt. 204, 158 At. 451 (1931); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
53. See Loftin v. City of Kansas City, 164 Kan. 412, 190 P.2d 378 (1948); Cluett
v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 262, 58 N.W. 1009 (1894); Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813, 223
N.W. 4 (1929). Compare Samuelson v. Olson Transp. Co., 324 Mich. 278, 86 N.W.2d
917 (1949).
54. 156 Tex. 525, 297 S.W.2d 120 (1956).
55. Id. at 533--34, 297 S.W.2d at 126.
56. See, e.g., Dunn v. Terminal .R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 285 S.W.2d 701, 709 (Mo.
1956); Mooney v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 352 Mo. 245, 261, 176 S.W.2d
605, 612 (1944); Lindsay v. Pettigrew, 3 S.D. 199, 52 N.W. 873 (1892), on second
trial, 10 S.D. 228,72 N.W. 574 (1897). See also Eizerman v. Behn, 9 I App. 2d 263,
287, 132 N.E.2d 788, 799 (1956). But see Romann V. Bender, 184 Minn. 586, 239
N.W. 596 (1931), on second trial, 190 Minn. 419, 252 N.W. 80 (1934).
57. See, e.g., James Smith Woolen Mach. Co. v. Holden, 73 Vt. 396, 51 At. 2
(1901): "The great weight of authority holds that the mischief is cured when the
offending counsel withdraws his statement or the court at once rules out the objec-
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improper argument impotent depends on the nature and degree of
the argument itself." But it is doubtful that this desired "curative"
effect can be achieved. Prejudice, both by legal and psychological
definition, is a forejudgment; a preconceived opinion formed before
sufficient information or knowledge is obtained to enable the person
to make an impartial judgment.0 9 The prejudice originates uncon-
sciously, so that the person is not aware of its formation. Although
it is irrational, the prejudiced opinion will probably be defended
vehemently as being based upon the facts." This is not to suggest
that the individual either consciously allows his prejudices to
influence his decision or intentionally defends a decision knowing
it to be based upon prejudice, but rather that prejudice is so skill-
fully camouflaged by the mind that the person may not realize its
presence or influence."'
No one is without some prejudices, but it is almost impossible to
discern whether or not the jurors have the type of prejudices the
improper argument is directed toward." And it is also very possible
that jurors who are in fact prejudiced cannot disregard an argument
directed to that prejudice, no matter how conscientious they may
be. 3 One court has aptly observed: "The red hot iron of prejudice
tionable matter and instructs the jury not to consider it." But see Brown v. Swine-
ford, 44 Wis. 282, 292-93 (1878) where the court said: "But it is not so certain
that a jury will do so [follow an instruction to disregard all statements of fact not in
evidence]. Verdicts are too often found against evidence and without evidence, to
warrant so great a reliance on the discrimination of juries."
58. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 212 Ala. 212, 102 So. 130
(1924) (withdrawal by counsel did not cure); Brush v. Laurendine, 168 Miss. 7,
150 So. 818 (1933) (sustaining objection did not cure).
59. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951); SIMPsoN & YINGER, RACIAL AND
CuLTURAL MiNorTrrIs: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCIMINATON 14-19,
265-66 (Rev. ed. 1958).
60. CRow & CROW, UNDERSTANDING Oua BmiAvion 94-95 (1956). An idea that
has been recognized for a long time. See WILSON, TrII A-MERICAN Juaon 77 (1868):
It is one of the peculiarities of prejudice, whenever it has obtained a complete
lodgment in the mind, that it enables us to believe that which we tvis to
believe. Under its influence, we may, without any regard to right reason, in a
certain sense honestly, believe or disbelieve false propositions.
61. Ibid.; CROW & CROW, op. cit. supra note 60.
62. Acting upon the same propositions and under the same apparent conditions
one individual will decide one way, and another, another way. . . .It means
that there is a bias in every personality. The nature of this bias is a com-
posite of hereditary tendencies, parental influences, personal experiences, and
the particular environmental pressure.
The presence of this unconscious bias makes every person a prejudiced in-
dividual. No matter how fair we try to be, the prejudice is there. 'An unpreju-
diced individual does not exist.'
MCCARThy, PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE LAWYER 102-03 (1929).
63. If one of the jury realizes that he is prejudiced, he may conscionciously try
to erase this prejudice from his consideration of the case. Such a conscious attempt
may result in overcompensation and subsequent injustice to the other party. "There
of course may be one here and there who is so afraid he will do an injustice that,
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has been thrust into the case; merely withdrawing it still leaves
a festering wound."" Of course, if in fact the jurors are not so
prejudiced, the improper argument can be disregarded in their con-
sideration of the case unless the argument itself creates a prejudice
in them." These factors should be kept in mind when examining
the various methods used to "cure" improper argument.
Sustained objection
The principal benefit of the sustained objection is that it stops a
line of improper argument. But it is also regarded as sufficient to
"cure" an improper argument which is mild in nature and degree.
For example the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held:
The remarks of counsel were improper in so far as they might be con-
strued as tending to argue or imply that the judge favored plaintiff's side,
however, any such effect of the remarks appears undone in the fact that
the court promptly sustained an objection to the remarks. 0
Apparently the sustained objection is thought to have "curative"
effect because it "impliedly carries with it an indication of dis-
approval. 67 But the value of a sustained objection standing alone
as a "curative7 act can be seriously questioned since it is doubtful
that jurors fully understand its legal significance."8 So the ruling on
the objection ordinarily is accompanied by one of the other forms
of "curative" action, usually an instruction that the jury disregard
the improper argument.
Instruction to disregard
The instruction to disregard an improper argument is based on
the presumption that juries do what judges tell them to do."9 How-
as it is said, he leans over backwards and thus does the opposite injustice." OsuoaN,
Tm MIIwD OF ThE JuRon 88 (1937).
64. O'Hara v. Lamb Construction Co., 197 S.W. 163, 165 (Mo. App. 1917).
Many courts, on the other hand, seem very reluctant to recognize that probability,
and generally resort to observations such as: "[M]odern juries generally are keen
and alert and usually sift the 'wheat from the chaff when they retire to a jury room
to consider the case in its entirety." Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transp. Co., 242 Minn.
157, 167, 64 N.W.2d 530, 536 (1954).
65. A very mild reference (de minimis), though improper, probably can be
disregarded by the jury.
66. Otis Elevator Co. v. Melott, 281 P.2d 408, 416 (Okla. 1954).
67. Rogers v. Broughton, 277 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
68. See Brush v. Laurendine, 168 Miss. 7, 13, 150 So. 818, 819 (1933) ("the
jury might not be impressed with objections and rulings thereon as having any
particular force save as between counsel and the judge").
69. See Petticrew v. Petticrew, 129 N.E.2d 194 (Ohio 1953). "[N]o reason to
doubt that the jury accepted the instructions of the court as given and disregarded
the statement of counsel." Hart v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 394, 397, 103 P.2d 65, 69
(1940). "In view of the instructions . . . , and in view of the size of the verdict we
feel justified in assuming that, even if the argument was objectionable, the jury
properly disregarded the statements of counseL" Yet at the same time courts
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ever, there are many adherents to the "realistic theory" of the jury
system, formulated by the late Judge Jerome Frank, which chal-
lenges the validity of the blind obedience presumption:
[The realistic theory] is based on what anyone can discover by ques-
tioning the average person who has served as a juror -namely that often
the jury are neither able to, nor do they attempt to, apply the instructions
of the court.7
0
Despite this "realistic theory," the presumption that the argument
will be disregarded has a pronounced effect on the trial judge. When
the opposing counsel objects to an improper argument, the judge
may be forced to decide whether or not granting a mistrial is neces-
sary to avoid prejudice, and, if the presumption is that the prejudi-
cial effect of the argument will be removed by an instruction to
disregard, a mistrial will rarely be granted.7' Two undesirable results
may follow from the courts' reluctance to declare mistrials: (1) in-
tentional improper arguments may be encouraged, and (2) the
particular litigant may be deprived of a fair trial.
Furthermore, perhaps instead of removing prejudice, the instruc-
tion may instill it in the minds of the jurors by specifically calling
the argument to their attention, and sometimes repeating its sub-
stance. In fact, a jury is normally instructed twice to disregard the
argument, once at the time the misconduct occurs and again when
the judge makes his charge to the jury.72 Such repetition tends to
recognize with respect to per se improper argument that the instruction is useless
as a cure. See Georgeson v. Nielsen, 218 Wis. 180, 185, 260 N.W. 461, 468 (1935).
Where the court after commenting how the objection and instruction increase the
prejudice said: "Even a reprimand . . . 'does not cure the wrong' . . . with more
reason may it be said that the Homeopathic dose here administered by the trial court
did not effect a cure." [Homeopathy: The theory or system of medical practice
holding that disease is cured by remedies which produce on a healthy person effects
similar to the symptoms of the complaint of the patient, the remedies usually admin-
istered in minute doses. WEnsTRa, NEw CoLoEMcATE DxarioNAny (2d ed. 1953).]
70. FRANK, Coufrs ON TRAL& 111 (1949). It is interesting that counsel for
plaintiff in one Minnesota case, Romann v. Bender, 184 Minn. 586, 587-88, 239
N.W. 596, 597 (1931), argued in his closing argument to the jury:
I moved the court to instruct the jury to disregard it [defendant's counsel's
improper argument] and the court did that. The court did that because it was
not fair, and it was not just and it was not decent, ladies and gentlemen, It was
not clean. Strike it out if you please, but it was there before this jury and you
cannot remove from the minds of the jury something that has improperly and
indecently crept into a lawsuit ....
Plaintiff's counsel himself was later reversed for making improper argument of
which the quoted portion was part, but principally because he argued: "But I want
to tell you ladies and gentlemen, when . . . [defendant's counsel] made that
statement here in court he knew that it was not true."
71. Graphic illustration that courts regard most improper argument curable Is
found in Corpus Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum which list twenty-two full columns
of cases holding improper argument cured by an instruction to disregard, and only
four columns of cases holding argument incurable by such an instruction. 88 C.J.S.
Trial § 200 n.75; § 202 n.1O (1951); 64 C.J. Trial § 310 n.15; § 312 n.38 (1929).
This does not include arguments that were cured by other commonly used measures.
72. The second instruction is often only a general charge for the jury "to disregard
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emphasize the improper argument in the minds of the jurors.ra The
results of the jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School,
in which thirty different lay juries were subjected to three almost
identical versions of a personal injury action, provide some evidence
that juries become more influenced as the argument is recalled to
their attention. The only differences among the three versions of the
evidence were that in the first the defendant disclosed on cross
examination that he had no insurance; the mean award was $33,000.
In the second version the defendant disclosed on cross examination
that he had insurance, no objection was made and there was nc
further mention of insurance; the mean award was $37,000. In the
third version, the defendant once again disclosed on cross examina-
tion that he had insurance, the remark was objected to and the trial
judge explicitly instructed the jury to disregard the statement; the
mean award was $46,000.74
Assuming these figures to be an accurate reflection of the reaction to
insurance, they document the common suspicion that juries react more
prejudicially to the defendant as insurance receives greater emphasis,
whether that emphasis comes by instruction to disregard or otherwise.
... The curative effect of an instruction to disregard, then, may be
seriously doubted, for apparently it serves only to further prejudice the
defendant's insurance company....Ts
Reprimand
The third type of "cure"-the reprimand-is used less fre-
quently than the instruction to disregard, and it is more disciplinary
in nature. However, many courts quite consistently say that
the purpose of a rebuke to counsel is not so much to reflect upon him,
criticize him or discipline him, as to impress the jury with the gravity of
his impropriety, whether he committed it in ignorance, unittingly or
deliberately.76
To be at all effective as a "cure,: the judge must, of course, give the
any statements of counsel concerning the evidence not borne out by the evidence."
See, I R. 's BANsoN IN.'raxcmcoNs To Jtmzs, § 77 (3d ed. 1936).
73. Some courts have recognized this. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Baltimore Bank of
Kansas City, 157 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. App. 1942); Bratt v. Smith, 180 Ore. 50, 175 P.2d
444 (1946). In a Pennsylvania case the court volunteered the following: "Unless
attention is called to improper remarks at the time they are made, trial judges
sometimes elect not to refer to them later on the theorr that ignoring them may be
less prejudicial than bringing them again into the jury s mind by directing the jury
to disregard them." Dura Seal Prod. Co. v. Carver, 181 Pa. Super. 377, 381 n.1,
124 A.2d 438, 440 n.1 (1956).
74. The facts reported here were taken from Note, 10 U. FI& L. REv. 68, 74 n.31,
(1957), which cites "mimeographed text of a speech, entitled, 'Report on the Jury
Project of the University of Chicago Law School,' delivered at a conference on legal
research at the University of Michigan Law School on Nov. 5, 1955, by Prof. Harry
Kalven, Jr., of the University of Chicago Law School."
75. Note, 10 U. Fi.A. L. REv. 68, 74-75 (1957).
76. Atlantic Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Childers, 60 Ga. App. 868, 871, 5 S.E.2d
388, 390 (1939).
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reprimand in the presence of the jury, and it must be neither too
slight nor too severe; if the censure is not severe enough, the jury
may still be prejudiced by the argument, but if the censure is too
severe it may create prejudice against the party whose counsel is
reprimanded.77
To the extent that the reprimand has a second purpose - criti-
cizing or disciplining counsel to deter future misconduct- the
intent with which the argument was made is an important factor in
determining the severity of the reprimand. If the improper conduct
was inadvertent, there is no deterrent value in a rebuke.
Withdrawal
The offending counsel may be able to cure his own misconduct
by withdrawing his own improper argument.78 This "curative" action
is subject to the same criticism made of all the other "curative"
methods: The jury has heard the prejudicial argument, and it might
weigh heavily in their minds while they are reaching their decision.
E. W~ivER
Generally the courts will hold that a party has waived his op por-
tunity to raise improper argument as a ground for reversal if ( 1) he
has failed to object to the misconduct at the trial level, or (2) he
has resorted to improper argument of his own. But this waiver rule
does not apply to argument which is per se prejudicial.8s
Necessity for objection
Although the trial judge is said to have a duty to control the
conduct of attorneys, a review of the cases shows that it is only
where any action, other than the declaration of a mistrial, would be
ineffective to "cure" the improper argument that the trial judge is
required to take the initiative in counteracting the argument.8 So,
77. See Kern County Finance Co. v. Iriart, 26 Cal. App. 2d 483, 79 P.2d 763
(1938) (where the court committed counsel to jail overnight for improper conduct);
In re Parkside Housing Project, 290 Mich. 582, 287 N.W. 571 (1939); Roy v. United
Elec. Railways, 52 R.I. 173, 159 AtI. 637 (1932).
78. See note 26 supra.
79. See Magoon v. Boston & M.R.R., 67 Vt. 177, 200, 31 At. 156, 162 (1894).
80. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 70 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1934); Hinman
v. Gould, 205 Minn. 377, 286 N.W. 364 (1939).
81. See, e.g., Taylor v. James, 85 A.2d 62 (Mun. Ct. of App. D.C. 1951); Mont-
gomery-Ward & Co. v. Wooley, 121 Ind. App. 60, 94 N.E.2d 677 (1950); Moran
v. Dumas, 91 N.H. 336, 18 A.2d 763 (1941); Texas Employer's Ass'n v. Haywood,
153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 856 (1954). See also Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transp. Co.,
242 Minn. 157, 166, 64 N.W.2d 530, 536 (1954), where the court said:
[T]here was neither a timely request for appropriate corrective action nor a
failure on the part of the trial court to act on such a request which would
permit us now to review the alleged misconduct, unless it was so flagrant and
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generally, an objection must be made and overruled at the trial
level before the misconduct can be raised on appeal.8 2 Some courts
require this objection to be made at the time the improper argument
is being made 13 while other courts regard the objection as timely
if it is made at the close of the entire argument 84
The theory behind requiring the offended party to object is that
he ought not to be allowed to remain silent hoping for a favorable
verdict and then be able to appeal if he loses, when on prompt
objection the trial court could have taken the necessary action to
render the argument harmless.85 Courts often rationalize their deci-
sions by describing the attorneys silence as a determination by him
that the argument did not influence the jury,' although this ration-
alization is not very persuasive. One criticism of the objection
requirement is that the offended party's objection may encourage
an adverse prejudicial effect by calling the jurys attention to the
improper argument or by creating the impression that he has some-
reprehensible that the trial court should have acted on its own motion to correct
it.
In Patton v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 247 Minn. 368, 875, 77 N.W.2d 433, 438
(1956), the same court observed that misconduct requiring the trial court to act on
its own motion "is rarely the situation."
82. Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 338 I. App. 864, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949); Seward
v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Miss. 656, 8 So. 2d 236 (1942); Patton v. Minneapolis St.
Ry., 247 Minn. 368, 875, 77 N.W.2d 438, 438 (1956):
Unless the misconduct is so flagrant as to require the trial court to act on its
own motion, which is rarely the situation . . . in order to raise the claim of
misconduct there must be an objection at the time of the alleged misconduct, or
at the close of the argument when it has been taken down by the reporter, and
before the jury retires; also a request for corrective action and the failure of
the court to act.
83. See, e.g., Harlan v. Taylor, 189 Cal. App. 30, 33 P.2d 422 (1934); Lindroth
v. Walgreen Co., 388 IlL App. 364, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949); Hilton v. Thompson,
360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950); Heavy Haulers v. Jones, 304 P.2d 292 (Okla.
1956).
84. See, e.g., London Guarantee & Ac. Co. v. WVoelfle, 83 F.2d 325, 343
(1936); Beebe v. Kleidon, 242 Minn. 371, 65 N.W.2d 614 (1954). The objection
must be made at the close of the argument, if a record is kept, otherwise objection
must be made at the time the argument is made. Sandomierski v. Fixemen, 163 Neb.
716, 81 N.W.2d 142 (1957). See text at note 87 infra.
85. See, e.g., Bryant v. Tulare Ice Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 566, 270 P.2d 880
(1954); Patton v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 247 Minm. 368, 375, 77 N.W.2d 433, 438
(1956) ("A party is not permitted to remain silent, gamble on the outcome, and,
having lost, then for the first time claim misconduct in opposing counsel's argument");
Safety Casualty Co. v. Wright, 140 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), affirmed,
160 S.W.2d 238.
86. See Pelzer v. Lange, No. 132, Minn. Sup. CL, Dec. 12, 1958; Jurgensen v.
Schirmer Trasp. Co., 242 Minn. 157, 166, 64 N.W.2d 580, 536 (19f4) ("failure
to call the courts attention to errors before the jury retires would suggest that
errors complained of were not deemed to be prejudicial by counsel at the time"). See
also Olson v. Prayfrock, No. 136, Minn. Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1958, where the court
held plaintiff made a determination by opposing defendant's motion for a mistrial
because of misconduct by plaintiff's counsel
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thing he wants to hide. This paradox has been noted by the Eighth
Circuit:
To interrupt the argument of opposing counsel is often a hazardous thing
to do. It may create more prejudice than it removes. It leads to contro-
versies between counsel which interfere with the orderly conduct of the
trial. Jurors do not ordinarily know the difference between proper and
improper argument. They easily obtain the impression that objecting
counsel is unfair and is trying to keep them from hearing something of
consequence. While the judge is in a better position . .. his interference
with argument may have the very opposite effect from that intended.
These things are best known to those members of the profession who do
not hesitate to appeal to passion and prejudice in the trial of their cases.8 7
Also the requirement gives the unscrupulous attorney a further
chance to influence the jury, since he can receive his opponent's
objection to improper argument with a retort such as:
Yes, gentlemen, I have touched a tender spot, the galled jade will wince.88
Forty years after this response was recorded in Georgia, it was used
by a different attorney in a California case. Dean Wigmore specu-
lates that perhaps the latter attorney had researched types of
improper arguments he could safely make.89
Retaliation
The offended party's counsel is not justified in retaliating to the
other's improper argument with one of his own. His only recourse
is to object and request curative action or a mistrial." If he does
retaliate, the courts generally hold that he has waived any right to
raise the issue of misconduct on appeal.91 Similarly, if the party who
made the first improper argument loses the case, the courts generally
87. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325, 343 (8th Cir.
1936); Franklin v. Nowak, 53 Ohio App. 44, 4 N.E.2d 232 (1935); Markowitz v.
Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. 230 Wis. 312, 284 N.W. 31 (1939). This
objection would be eliminated if the attorney were allowed to hold his objection
until the close of the entire argument.
88. 6 WIGMoRE, EvIDENcE § 1806 n.1 (3d ed. 1940), citing, Berry v. State, 10
Ga. 511 (1851), and People v. Ah Len, 92 Cal. 282, 28 Pac. 286 (1899). See
Deibler v. Wright, 119 Cal. App. 2d 277, 282, 6 P.2d 344, 346 (1931) ("apparently
they don't want that information").
89. 6 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1806.
90. See, e.g., N.Y. Central R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 317 (1929); Walker
v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951); Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Green,
268 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
91. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. Gee, 197 Ark. 925, 125 S.W.2d 802
(1939); Donovan v. Richmond, 61 Mich. 467, 28 N.W. 516 (1886). Counsel may also
waive where he elects to answer opposing counsel's argument without retaliating.
For example, in Pelzer v. Lange, No. 132, Minn. Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1958, the court
said:
We do not condone the tactics adopted or statements made by defendant's
counsel in his closing argument as above described. They were entirely uncalled
for and had nothing to do with the issues in the litigation or the evidence sub-
mitted in connection therewith. Obviously, they were designed to create bias
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hold that he too 2 has waived the right to raise his opponent's
improper argument on appeal.93
However, to constitute waiver by both sides, the arguments must
be substantially of the same type and degree; a reference to the
defendant's being a corporation will not waive a racial argument
against plaintiff. This requirement is to prevent one counsel from
waiting for the first sign of an improper argument by the other
counsel, and launching into a highly prejudicial argument in reply
to any technically improper argument whether or not it would
have had any prejudicial effect on the jury. 5 On the other hand,
an improper argument with little or no prejudicial effect made in
response to a highly prejudicial one will not bar the retaliating
attorney from raising the opposing counsel's improper argument on
appeal.9 6 But where the arguments are about equally prejudicial,
courts treat the improper arguments as counterbalancing each other
so that one has no greater effect on the jury than the other. Although
it is true that each of the arguments might neutralize the prejudicial
effect of the other, there is no way of determining precisely what
effect the argument had on a particular jury.97
IV. ALTERNATIVES AND UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS
The reluctance of trial judges to declare mistrials in cases where
there have been improper arguments probably encourages the use
of improper argument. The unscrupulous attorney who intentionally
makes an improper argument has little to lose, since he gets the
prejudicial material before the jury and there normally ill be no
against plaintiff, and had not the plaintiff's counsel proceeded with the trial
and undertaken to answer such statements in his closing argument, they would
be deemed reprehensible to the extent of requiring a new trial.
(Emphasis added.)
92. Courts often say that the first attorney to make improper argument has
"invited" opposing counsel to retaliate.
93. See, e.g., Gibson v. Iowa Cent. Ry., 115 Minn. 147, 131 N.W. 1057
(1911); Wood v. New York State Ele. & Gas Corp., 257 App. Div. 172, 12 N.Y.S2.d
947 (1939), affirmed, 281 N.Y. 797, 24 N.E.2d 480 (1939); Cosar v. Bemo, 282
P.2d 222 (Okla. 1955).
94. See, e.g., Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956); Hinman
v. Gould, 205 Minn. 377, 286 N.W. 364 (1939); Sanders v. Lowrimore, 73 SAV.2d
148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
95. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. By. v. Dickens, 56 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1900); Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Ramseyer, 190 Ind. 192, 128 N.E. 844 (1921).
96. See, e.g., Jones v. Kansas City, 76 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. 1934).
97. Big Ledge Copper Co. v. Dedrick, 21 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac. 825 (1919); Tomson
v. Kischassey, 144 CaL App. 2d 363, 301 P.2d 55 (1956); Cosar v. Berno, 282 P.2d
222 (Okla. 1955); MacGregor v. Bradshaw, 193 Va. 787, 71 S.E.2d 361 (1952).
In each of these cases, the defendant's attorney made some type of argument imply-
ing that the defendant was broke, and the plaintiffs attorney retaliated with a
remark which implied the defendant had insurance. See Note, 7 Omo ST. L.J.
281 (1941). Perhaps the best example of the balancing out factor is Samuelson v.
Olson Transp. Co., 324 Mich. 278, 36 N.W.2d 917 (1949), where the plaintiffs
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reversal of a judgment in his favor,9" because either the jury will be
instructed to disregard the argument or it will be waived by the
opposing attorney's failure to object. Furthermore, he has success-
fully placed his innocent opponent in a dilemma. The opponent
may object and move for a mistrial, but the motion will probably
be denied. He may object and request that the jury be instructed
to disregard the improper argument, but then he runs the risk that
the objection and instruction will create greater prejudice to his
case by emphasizing the argument. Third, he may gamble that the
argument had no effect on the jury and remain silent, in which case
he waives any objection to the argument unless it was per se
prejudicial. Finally, the offended counsel may consider the argument
so harmful that he is forced to resort to improper argument to
counteract the one by his opponent. Since retaliating with an
improper argument is itself misconduct, the attorney subjects him-
self to danger of censure by the court and condemnation by the
bar and the public.9 Even after counsel has employed one or more
of these possible remedies, the improper argument may still have
reduced the offended party's chances of winning or of keeping the
verdict at a reasonable sum, for the jury may not be able to disre-
gard the improper argument. At the same time, the unscrupulous
attorney who made the argument could not have hurt his chances
of winning the lawsuit except in the few cases where a mistrial is
granted.
Courts should consider several possible alternatives to the present
rules used in improper argument cases. One approach would be to
adopt a rule that would consider principally the intent with which
the improper argument is made. Under this rule, if the argument
were intended to provoke juror prejudice and it were not de minimis,
attorney in a personal injury action said the defendant, having insurance, should
pay, and the defendant's attorney retaliated saying that the plaintiff had workmen's
compensation.
98. Under the present rules, reversal is generally granted only if the argument
is per se prejudicial or the trial judge has failed to apply the proper "curative"
action. In Olson v. Prayfrock, No. 136, Minn. Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1958, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court commented:
It is difficult for us to understand why experienced counsel will hazard the
possibility of a reversal of a trial, otherwise free from error, by tactics which
they must know are bound to be subject to the condemnation of this court.
It is not enough to say that they were overzealous or did not know better. Even
a cursory examination of the opinions of this court should be sulflciont to
disclose the fact that we do not approve of such tactics.
Perhaps the fact that the court in this case did not reverse gives some clue to the
answer to the problem the court expresses difilculty with.
99. The following appeared in Minneapolis Star Journal: "High Court Scores
3 Lawyers for Conduct in Injury Trials- Conduct of three lawyers was criticized
by the Minnesota Supreme Court today in decisions upholding Ramsey County
district court verdicts in two personal injury cases." The Mpls. Star, Dec. 12, 1958,
§ B, p. 9, col. 3.
[Vol. 43:545
the trial court should declare a mistrial, and failure to do so should
be grounds for reversal. The trial judge could determine whether
the argument was made in bad faith by considering (1) the nature
and degree of the argument, (2) the conduct of counsel after being
instructed that his conduct is improper,100 and (8) other particular
facts of each case. The appellate court could review the trial judge's
findings, giving added authoritative weight to his determination, and
in addition check the past record of the offending attorney. A past
history of intentional improper argument by counsel would increase
the likelihood that the improper argument in the present case was
made intentionally.
A rule based on intent would tend to assure fair trials by deterring
counsel from intentionally using improper argument However,
basing a rule solely on intent would not completely solve the ques-
tion of whether or not the jury in a particular case was prejudiced
by the improper argument, since inadvertent improper argument
may be as prejudicial as argument intentionally made. And reversal
based solely on intent may be unfair to the party whose verdict is
reversed, since intentional improper argument is not necessarily
prejudicial.
Instituting contempt proceedings against the attorney who pur-
posely makes an improper argument is a possible second method of
curbing intentional improper argument' 0' And at the same time,
this measure would not penalize the attorneys client by reversing
an otherwise meritorious case. Of course, this method is not de-
signed to afford a fair trial to the other party in the particular case.
100. For example, whether or not he continues the argument or resorts to a new
line of improper argument.
101. "The trial court can and should institute contempt proceedings against
recalcitrant counsel and impose either a fine or jail sentence." Eizerman v. Behn,
9 111. App. 263, 287, 132 N.E.2d 788, 799 (1956). Somewhat related to contempt
proceedings would be the following action suggested by the Colorado court: "declare
a mistrial and assess the costs to the transgressor." Lewis v. Oliver, 129 Colo. 479,
483, 271 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1954). It is doubtful how sigaificant taxing costs to the
attorney would be.
One other alternative of dealing with intentional misconduct would be to handle
the matter within local bar associations, since there is little doubt that such conduct
is a violation of the Canon of Candor and Fairness:
The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other lawyers should be
characterized by candor and fairness.
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer lmowingly . . . in argument to assert
as a fact that which has not been proved. ...
A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the Court should reject,
in order to get the same before the jury by argument for its admissibility ...
Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed to the Court, remarks
or statements intended to influence the jury or bystanders.
Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 229. See also, A Code of Trial Conduct, 43
A.B.A.J. 223 (1957). Statutory standards are of doubtful value.
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And because of the harshness of contempt sanctions, they probably
would only be applied where the argument is flagrantly prejudicial.
In this per se situation a reversal is already granted. And if an
attorney intends to use improper argument, he can make an argu-
ment similar to one that has already been allowed by the court,10 2
and thus considerably reduce the chance of being reversed.
Another alternative to the present rules would apply both to
intentional and inadvertent improper argument.' If it is true that
an opposing counsel's objection and an instruction to disregard may
increase the likelihood of prejudice, the presumption that an im-
proper argument is "curable" and the rule requiring an objection
should be discarded.10 4 And perhaps, the presumption should o
against the party whose counsel makes the improper argument: 105
where improper argument is made it should be presumed to have
prejudicially influenced the jury. True, this presumption would
place a greater burden on innocent clients for the conduct of an
attorney over whom they, in fact, have no control, and "a litigant
should not be deprived of a verdict in his favor and thus penalized
because of the improper conduct of his counsel unless it is likely
that such conduct resulted in prejudice to the adverse party and
operated to deprive him of a fair trial."' 06 Yet it must be remem-
102. See text at note 89 supra.
103. With respect to the intentional improper argument, the disciplinary measures
discussed supra in the text might also be applied.
104. Also, it is difficult to see why retaliation, at least to some reasonable extent,
should not be condoned. This would, of course, be adopting "self-defense" into
the law governing argument to the jury. But if counsel for the defendant argues
that the defendant is a pauper and an adverse verdict would break him, it is bard
to say he has been deprived of a "fair trial" when the plaintiff's attorney answers
that the defendant is insured. See note 97 supra.
Though to go as far as Lord Macaulay advocated would make many hesitate:
"Macauly said that we obtain the fairest decision 'when two men argue, as
unfairly as possible, on opposite sides,' for then 'it is certain that no important
consideration will altogether escape notice."' FRANKl, CoUrTs ON TRIAL 80 (1949).
In Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Green, 268 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954),
the court said:
The wrong of one attorney will not justify a like wrong on the part of another
by way of retaliation, although an appellate court will not hesitate to set aside
a verdict which has been induced by language, not justified by the record,
though the opposing counsel may have given the first offense. . . . In every
instance the court should consider the action or statement of each attorney in
relation to its probable effect upon the verdict. . . .This does not affect the
general rule that where improper remarks of counsel for one party are of such
nature as to call for a reply, and the language used does not seem to have
gone beyond the bounds of a legitimate answer the jury's verdict will not be
disturbed.
105. See Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Dickson, 219 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949); Wilson v. Dyer, 116 Vt. 342, 347, 75 A.2d 677, 680 (1950): "As
the argument was prejudicial, it is taken to have prejudiced, for presumptions go
against the wrongdoer."
106. Hoffer v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278, 300, 49 N.W.2d 282, 295 (1951) (on re-
hearing).
bered that the party on the other side, who also has a right to a
"fair trial," is totally innocent, and if equities are to be balanced,
the weight is in his favor.107 Also, courts are not overly solicitous of
clients who lose cases because of incompetence of counsel, 1 8 and
it is difficult to see why a different rule should apply where clients
lose because of impropriety of counsel. The wrongdoer could over-
come the presumption in various ways; for example, he could show(1) that the argument was de minimis, (2) that the evidence was so
clearly in his favor that the argument made no difference, or (3) that
the other side either invited the misconduct or retaliated and that
there was no substantial difference in the nature and degree of the
improper arguments.
However, if the courts are so firmly committed to the old pre-
sumption that they refuse to change it,09 an improvement in the
law on improper arguments should come from the trial judges them-
selves who should show less reluctance to grant new trials or
mistrials when improper argument has been made. Or an improve-
ment could come at the appellate level by expanding the per se
prejudicial category of improper argument Courts at both levels
could make more use of sanctions against recalcitrant counsel-
more and sterner rebukes, more findings of contempt, and more
encouragement of state disbarment or suspension proceedings for
serious intentional improper argument.
Of course, any rule that would require more reversals would
impose an additional burden on the dockets of an already over-
worked court system.110 However, if the theory is sound that more
107. In Rom v. Calhoun, 227 Minn. 148, 148, 34 N.V.2d 859, 362 (1948), the
court observed:
It is unfortunate that litigants must suffer the expense and inconvenience of a
new trial on account of misconduct of counsel, but if attorneys persist in doing
that which they must know is improper there is no other way of correcting
what might well be a miscarriage of justice. We feel that in this case there
should be a new trial for misconduct of counsel.
108. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 319 Mich. 475, 482, 29 N.V.2d 919, 921(1947) ("The general rule is that in civil cases incompetence of counsel is not a
sufficient reason for granting a new trial") See generally 66 C.J.S. New Trial
82(b) (1950).
109. See Note, 54 CoLrum. L. Rlv. 946, 967 (1954): "The courts, however, are
committed to the theory that juries can disregard such appeals to prejudice if
properly instructed.
110. Courts may well be considering the crowded court calendar while determin-
ing these misconduct cases. See, e.g., Patton v. Minneapolis St. fy., 247 Minn.
368, 376, 77 N.W.2d 433, 438 (1956). "There have been three trials and this long
drawn out litigation should come to an end unless prejudice has been shown and an
injustice has been done." (Emphasis added.) Murphy v. Bartlow Realty Co., 214
Minn. 64, 78, 7 N.W.2d 684, 690 (1948). ". . . ]e do not believe that any of the
statements complained of are so prejudicial as to require the retrial of a case which
took about three weeks to try the first time"; Lumbermen's Lloyds v. Loper, 153
Tex. 404, 405, 269 S.W.2d 367 (1954):
The assignments of error in this workmen's compensation suit add yet again
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reversals would deter future improper argument, the impact on the
court system would be only temporary.
A second consequence of stricter rules requiring more reversals
for improper argument might be curtailment of some proper jury
arguments."' For such rules could cause some attorneys to refrain
from making arguments which they believe would be proper but
which they think a judge might find improper. Thus to the extent
that arguments are not made on all the evidence and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom, a client is deprived of the full benefits of
the adversary system. But it is doubtful that more reversals would
impose much if any restriction on proper jury argument by counsel,
for the reversals would come in cases having obvious improper
argument similar to that in many of the hundreds of cases now
holding improper argument to have been "curable." The principal
objection to the present rules is not that courts fail to recognize some
unfair arguments to be improper, but rather that the courts too
often fail to grant new trials or mistrials in cases in which they
presently find improper argument.
to our lengthening list of improper argument cases, which, because of the
reticence of trial judges, lack of self-restraint on the part of lawyers, or somo
other cause, increasingly burden an already heavy docket of personal injury
claims.
111. In Foster v. Kurn, 133 S.W.2d 1114, 1120 (Mo. App. 1939), the court said:
We have no desire to discourage the becoming ardor that an attorney should
have for his client's cause. We conceive the fact that a law suit may credibly
be designated as a 'Battle Royal.' However, the best interests of the legal
profession are best subserved by placing a prohibition on poison gas.
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